Contribution/Originality: This study originates a new approach to attempt to resolve the challenge of causality in the relationship between corporate governance and firm performance by improvising a randomized experiment which made it possible to examine two sets of firms-one which appointed more non-executive directors and another that appointed more executive directors.
INTRODUCTION
The banking system is the engine of growth in any economy given its functions of financial intermediation, provision of an efficient payment system and facilitating the implementation of monetary policies (Nwaubani and Ezeudu, 2015) . This fact is also acknowledged by Ogunbiyi and Ihejirika (2014) who describe banking as an economic activity which deals with the intermediation of funds between the surplus units and the deficit units of an economy and the channeling of such resources to profitable investments. Moyo et al. (2014) see the banking industry from its essential role of resource mobilization and allocation in an economy and, its position as the most important segment of the financial system in developing economies.
The genesis of banking in Sub Saharan Africa dates back to pre-colonial days and spans mainly through the era dominated by foreign-owned banks at the time of independence of African nations, the phase of government intervention/state-owned banks and the era of banking crises in the 1980s and 1990s. The banking crises era of the 1980s and 1990s is followed by the period of financial liberalization/reforms, increased private sector participation and entry of foreign banks (Beck et al., 2014; Otchere and Senbet, 2017) . Another important phase is the emergence of African banks by origin which has engaged in significant cross-border expansion within the African continent (Mecagni et al., 2015) .
Globally, business entities do not operate in isolation. They are an integral part of and influenced by the environment they operate in. The environment could be broadly categorized into internal and external. The internal environment at its simplest level refers to all the factors which are specific to a particular organization and influence the operations and performance of the organization. The internal environment of the banking industry in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA) over the recent decades has been very dynamic, increasingly complex and challenging particularly with the influence of globalization. The phenomenon has put deposit money banks under increasing pressure to adjust their internal environment in order to survive and remain relevant in the industry.
One of the crucial factors of the internal environment is corporate governance which is defined as the The issue of corporate governance has in recent years become a topical one among policymakers and other various stakeholders particularly in emerging and developing markets. Poor corporate governance has been linked to some notable corporate failures and financial scandals in the recent past such as the collapse of Enron, Worldcom, Tyco and Xerox in the United States of America and most bank distress and failures in Nigeria and elsewhere in the World (Akingunola et al., 2013; Gyamerah and Agyei, 2016) .
Objective of the Study
The main purpose of this study is to determine the effect of appointment of directors on the performance of deposit money banks in Sub Saharan Africa (SSA). Specific objectives are an examination of:
(i) The effect of appointment of more non-executive directors than executive directors to the board on return on assets (ROA) of deposit money banks in SSA
(ii) The effect of appointment of more executive directors than non-executive to the board on ROA of deposit money banks in SSA (iii) The effect of a appointment of more non-executive directors than executive directors to the board on net interest margin (NIM) of deposit money banks in SSA (iv) The effect of appointment of more executive directors than non-executive to the board on NIM of deposit money banks in SSA.
Four hypotheses were formulated in a null form and tested at 95% confidence level as stated below:
Ho1: Appointment of more non-executive directors than executive directors to the board has no Significant effect on ROA of deposit money banks in SSA.
Ho2: Appointment of more executive directors than non-executive directors to the board has no
Significant effect on ROA of deposit money banks in SSA.
Ho3: Appointment of more non-executive directors than executive directors to the board has no
Significant effect on NIM of deposit money banks in SSA.
Ho4: Appointment of more executive directors than non-executive directors to the board has no
Statement of the Problem
A number of empirical studies on corporate governance and performance of banks have been carried out.
However, empirical studies which considered corporate governance as one of the internal factors influencing the profitability of deposit money banks in the SSA as a region are scanty (Flamini et al., 2009) . Also, only a few empirical works not even on SSA as a region but on individual countries of SSA (Kyereboah-Coleman and Biekpe, 2008; John, 2015; Atuahene, 2016; Dauda and Hawa, 2016) John (2015) and Yilmaz and Buyuklu (2016) reported negative outcomes. The motivation for this study is therefore, a desire to enrich empirical studies on corporate governance in SSA particularly with respect to the appointment of directors and to attempt to resolve the documented conflict in findings.
THE CONCEPT OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Corporate governance according to IFC (2016) is defined as the structures and processes by which companies are directed and controlled. Going further, the Corporation notes that good corporate governance leads to the efficient performance of companies, improved access to capital and serves as risk mitigant and a check on mismanagement resulting in more accountability and transparency to all stakeholders. The author adds that African countries have joined the global drive for greater transparency and accountability. Perhaps this informs the position of World Bank that good corporate governance enhances firms' performance and access to capital (World Bank, 2005) . A broader approach to corporate governance is adopted by King III Committee on Corporate Governance for South Africa in which the legitimate interests and expectations of all stakeholders apart from shareholders are considered and recognized in board decisions in order to promote sustainability of the organization (KPMG, 2014) .
Corporate governance can also be viewed from a border perspective as the processes and structures by which organizations are directed and controlled so that they will operate in a responsible, fair and transparent manner to all stakeholders while being held accountable in order to serve and sustain the interests and expectations of the stakeholders.
Ordinarily, the structures and processes by which companies are directed and controlled are primarily internal to a firm. However, as part of the government responsibility to provide legislation and regulations to ensure that the business entities adopt best practices and operate in a manner that protects the interests of all stakeholders, codes of corporate governance have been introduced for adoption by organizations. This cuts across the globe.
The necessity of adoption of the corporate governance codes for banks in Sub Saharan Africa stems particularly from the gross mismanagement hitherto witnessed in the region's banking sector particularly between the 1980s and 1990s. The mismanagement was fueled by technical and managerial incompetence and unethical practices which are some of the key issues being addressed by the corporate governance codes. This opinion agrees with the view of Akingunola et al. (2013) who linked the bank distress in Nigeria in the 1990s to the failure of professional ethics which manifested in such acts as creative accounting practices, disregard to internal control systems among others.
Corporate governance in SSA has been on the fore burner through the activities of African Corporate Governance Table 1 suggests that SSA countries are making progress in the area of adopting best corporate governance codes. However, notwithstanding the progress in the issuance and adoption of the relevant corporate governance code in each country in SSA region, it seems appropriate to stress the need for effective internal control systems, integrity, professionalism, technical competency and commitment of the members of the board of directors of each firm. This caution aligns with the view of FBN (2015) that -Effective corporate governance practices are largely dependent on the skills, integrity and experience of individuals on the Board and how well they are committed to doing business in accordance with global best practices‖ 
THE IMPORTANCE OF BOARD COMPOSITION: THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
Board composition is very crucial to the success and survival of a firm particularly a deposit money bank because it is the board members who collectively formulate and implement policies of the bank on behalf of the owners of the business -shareholders. As FBN (2015) acknowledges -good governance practices are best initiated and observed in the boardroom‖.
An ineffective policy will ordinarily produce at best a less desirable result and an effective policy poorly implemented will not give the desired outcome.
The real issues associated with the appointment of directors are the problem of conflicting interests among the directors and managers as agents of the shareholders against the interest of the shareholders-their principal. This conflict is known as the agency problem which necessitates agency costs to the organization. The agency problem tends to hinder objective decisions which are in the best interest of the shareholders and other stakeholders for reasons which weigh more on personal interests of the agents. The agency problems are encapsulated in the agency theory which in turn is rooted in the firm theory.
The agency theory credited to Stephen Ross and Mitnick (2006) is concerned with the nature of the principalagent relationship, the rights and responsibilities of each party, the agency problems and how to minimize them via various corporate governance practices and observations aimed at controlling decisions and actions of the agent's in the modern firm. Agency theory can be considered as one of the oldest theory in the literature of management and economics (Wasserman, 2006) .
On the other hand, the firm theory could be viewed as consisting a number of economic theories that explain and predict the nature of the firm, its existence, behavior, structure, and relationship with all stakeholders and the market (Wikipedia, 2018) . The neo-classical or traditional firm is a single business entity whose entire operations are carried out by an entrepreneur with the main objective of profit maximization (Jhingan and Stephen, 2009 ). It considers the sole objective of a firm to be profit maximization and measures profit as the difference between a firm's total revenue and total cost and asserts that in order to maximize profit, the firm is expected to maximize its revenues and minimize or stabilize its costs. However, the authors recognize that modern firms have varied objectives because of the complexities, politics and separation of ownership from management which characterize them. They note that modern firms are run by managers/directors while shareholders are the owners with separate roles and motives from those of the managers. These facts render the sole objective of profit maximization of the traditional firm unrealistic as the modern firm has varied objectives.
In 1964 Robin Marris developed a dynamic balanced growth maximizing managerial model of the firm in recognition of the varied interests of the managers and shareholders (Marris, 1964) . Marris suggests that managers/directors are usually more concerned with salary, prestige, status, power, job security while shareholders are more interested in profits, market share and output (http://www.economicsdiscussion.net/firm/top-3-theoriesof-firm-with-diagram). This tendency introduces the conflict of interests which implies that the directors/managers may not act in the interest of the shareholders who bear the risk of the decisions of the executive directors and managers. The need therefore, to monitor the interests/activities of the executive directors and managers had long been identified. According to Fama and Jensen (1983) this need underscores the desire for the appointment of outside/independent directors in the board. The view of the two erudite scholars is that appointment of the outside/non-executive directors would help to control the decisions of the executive directors and align them to the interest of risk-bearers-the shareholders. This conflict of interests is known as the agency problem and was as far back as 1776 noted by Adam Smith (Panda and Leepsa, 2017) .
It is therefore very imperative for not only organizations but governments to take well-thought-out steps to checkmate this necessary evil called agency problem. The corporate governance code in most countries specifies that number of non-executive directors shall be appointed on the board of directors of a firm as a way of minimizing the agent problem. Generally, corporate governance code and specific regulatory directives on board composition are part of the attempt at minimizing the problem of conflict of interests in organizations. It is assumed by the policymakers and governments -regulators and supervisors that non-executive directors particularly independent non-executive directors are more objective since they are independent and are not in full-time employment of the organization concerned. The humble opinion of the researcher is that the non-executive directors may not be actually independent as their appointment may be directly or indirectly sponsored by the executive directors whose personal interests the non-executive directors may not like to betray.
SUMMARIZED EMPIRICAL REVIEW
Empirical works which documented a general positive-performance link outcomes are: Black (2001) 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research design adopted in this work is ex-post facto. Secondary data from 12 deposit money banks selected ROAic,t/NIMic,t = α +∑ β1BNEDDUM ic,t +∑β2BMEDDU ict + Vi,t
Where:
ROAic,t is the return on total assets of bank i in country c for period t; NIMic,t is the net interest margin of bank i in country c for period t.
BNEDDUM ic,t / BMEDDUM ict is the board composition of bank i in country c for period t, α is the constant for the model β1 to β2 are parameters/ beta coefficients to be estimated νit= uit + εit is the composite disturbance factor, while uit = between-entity errors and εit = within-entity errors (the idiosyncratic errors).
ROA is employed in this study (as also used in Yesmine and Bhuiyah (2015) ; Mungly et al. (2016) and Iacobelli (2017) and is preferred to the average-assets values of return on average assets (ROAA). This is because between ROAA and ROA, ROAA is often expected to give higher profitability since it uses average assets which usually are lower than gross assets. The emphasis here is on profitability and the researcher's view is that a conservative approach which yields less profitability appears preferable. The choice of ROAA approach is usually anchored on the argument that it avoids (smoothens out) the effects of extreme-year-end values of assets such as possible use of window dressing techniques (Perera et al., 2013) . However, the avoidance of the extreme (usually) higher values tends to result in higher profitability ratios which may be misleading. In view of this, ROA which gives lower ratios under extreme high values appears preferable.
Methods of Data Analysis
Panel data multiple regression approach is employed to analyze the panel data under random effects and fixed effects models with the aid of Eviews 8 while SPSS (20) is used for production of relevant supporting graphs and generation of multivariate correlations. The use of fixed or random effects model for each variable is dictated by the result of Hausman test. The random effects model is adopted when it appears that the error terms (unique errors)
are not correlated with the explanatory variables (Torres-Reyna, 2007) . This is determined via the Hausman test.
The null hypothesis in the Hausman test is that the preferred model is random effects model otherwise, fixed effects is the preferred model. The null hypothesis (random effects model) is rejected and the fixed effects model accepted if the resulting p-value from the test is less than the selected level of significance. The Table 2 above which indicates the correlation among the variables was generated to assist in driving discussion of findings under Section 7 below. The Table is fully discussed under the Section 7. Table 3c shows the results of the Hausman test. Details of the results constitute the findings of the study and are fully discussed under Section 7 below. 
DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS

Results of the Panel Data Regression Analysis
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS
The board of directors with more number of non-executive directors than executive directors (BNEDDUM) has a positive insignificant effect on return on assets (ROA)-hypothesis1while exhibiting negative insignificant effect on net interest margin (NIM)-hypothesis 3. It also shows a positive significant correlation with both ROA and NIM (Table 2) implies that changes in corporate governance will produce changes in performance. This may only be true if the variation in corporate governance measure is at random and independent of other variables in the model under study. The problem of endogeneity arises when variation in corporate governance variable depends on some unmodeled causes (the error terms) which also affect other variables in the model (Antonakis et al., 2014 ).
An adjudged credible method of resolving this challenge is the randomized experiment in which a researcher randomly assigns some subjects to receive a treatment, while others do not receive any treatment (Love, 2010) . The outcomes are compared between the two groups. In the case of governance-performance relationship research, the design would include firms as the subjects, the treatment as the changes in corporate governance and the results as performance. Because the treatment is random by design, any differences in outcome could credibly be attributed to the treatment -improvements in corporate governance. In the real world, this methodology will be very hard to implement because of practical involvements such as identifying firms willing to form a list for random selection of firms which will, in turn, form a group also willing to have some aspects of their corporate governance structures changed in the experiment. Such a change may entail dropping some executive directors for more non-executive directors or vice versa among others.
In this study, the researcher tries to be innovative by introducing a hypothetical board of directors composed of more executive directors (BMEDDUM) appointed for eight years (61%) out of the thirteen years period covered by this study. The eight years for each bank is randomly populated with ones (1s) which is the dummy for executive directors. The introduction is an attempt to improvise a mechanism mirroring the randomized experiment so that the outcome based on the non-executive directors appointment -BNEDDUM may be compared and accepted or otherwise with a level of credibility.
It appears that the introduction has added to the acceptability of the outcome with respect to the appointment of more non-executive directors (BNEDDUM). For instance, BNEDDUM indicates a positive significant relationship with both ROA and NIM Tables 5 & 6 while the introduction of BMEDDUM (more executive directors appointment) reverses the positive significant relationship to a negative insignificant correlation with ROA and positive insignificant relationship with NIM Table 6 . The negative insignificant correlation of BMEDDUM with ROA seems to logically confirm the positive significant relationship of BNEDDUM with ROA.
The same reasoning applies to NIM. It also suggests that the appointment of more non-executive directors enhances performance more than appointment of more executive directors.
With respect to the effect of BNEDDUM on ROA and NIM under Tables 5&6 it exhibits a positive insignificant effect on ROA and insignificant negative effect on NIM. The introduction of BMEDDUM again reverses the outcome showing a negative and insignificant effect on ROA and positive significant effect on NIM.
This implies that replacing the appointment of more non-executive directors with the appointment of more executive directors will have a negative effect on profitability (ROA). The reversal tends to confirm that the appointment of more non-executive directors (BNEDDUM) actually has a positive insignificant effect on ROA.
This is the essence of the introduction of the hypothetical appointment which analogically serves as a change of existing board appointments which may be very difficult to achieve in the real world.
However, when we consider the effect of the two types of appointments on NIM only, appointment of more executive directors is preferred as it exhibits a positive significant effect against the insignificant negative effect of appointment of more non-executive directors. Conversely, the board with more non-executive appears more beneficial to the deposit money banks when the effect of the two boards on ROA only is taken into account as this board indicates a positive insignificant effect against a negative and insignificant effect of the board with more executive directors. This suggests that the conflict in the findings associated with board appointments globally is not yet fully resolved. In view of this, it appears that the desired corporate governance is likely to emerge from within rather than exogenously and so be dependent on specific characteristics of each firm and its environment.
This humble opinion of the researcher is consistent with the view of World Bank research staff, Love (2010).
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Conclusion
Appointment of more non-executives on a Board of directors of deposit money banks in SSA appears more beneficial to the banks than appointment of more executive directors. However, the conflict in the findings associated with board appointment globally is not yet fully resolved and suggests that the desired corporate governance is likely to emerge from within and be dependent on specific characteristics of each bank and its environment rather than exogenously.
Recommendations
It is recommended that while more non-executive directors than executive directors may be appointed to the Board of Directors of deposit money banks in SSA, each bank must ensure that it puts in place robust internal control systems which promote a culture of prudence and professionalism in management. Appointment of nonexecutive directors should be devoid of interference of the executive directors as much as possible in order to minimize the incident of conflict of interests.
